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OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
In 2004 in the District of New Jersey, Charles Murray 
pleaded guilty to traveling interstate to engage in illicit sexual 
conduct with a minor.  Later that same year, in a separate case in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, he pleaded guilty to possession of 
child pornography.  For these offenses, he was sentenced to an 
aggregate term of 95 months‟ imprisonment, to be followed by 
concurrent three-year terms of supervised release.  Both of Murray‟s 
sentencing judges imposed upon him various special conditions of 
supervised release that, for example, require him to register as a sex 
offender and to submit to unannounced searches of his computer.   
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After Murray was released from prison in July 2010, he 
moved to the Western District of Pennsylvania.  That District thus 
assumed jurisdiction over him for the remainder of his term of 
supervised release.  Though Murray had not violated his existing 
supervised release conditions, the Probation Office sought to modify 
them to bring them in line with the conditions of release that are 
typically used in the Western District.  Some of the Probation 
Office‟s proposed conditions were duplicative of those already 
mandated by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and District of 
New Jersey, but others were new.  The District Court granted the 
Probation Office‟s request and imposed several new, more stringent 
conditions on Murray.  Murray now appeals.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will remand this case to the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
  
 In the spring of 2003, Murray made contact online with a 14 
year-old boy and the two communicated via phone and instant 
message for several months.  On two occasions in May 2003, 
Murray crossed state lines, picked up the boy, and took him to a 
private parking lot where they engaged in sexual acts.  Although 
Murray insisted that the sex was consensual, the boy reported that he 
believed he did not have a choice.  Thus, on April 1, 2004, Murray 
pleaded guilty to two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to 
engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2423(b).  The District Court for the District of New Jersey 
sentenced him to a term of 83 months‟ imprisonment for each count, 
to be served concurrently, followed by a three-year term of 
supervised release.  Along with the standard conditions of 
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supervised release, the District Court imposed some additional 
conditions.
1
   
 
 In July 2003, during the course of their investigation of the 
New Jersey case, federal officers executed a search warrant at 
Murray‟s Pennsylvania residence.  The officers seized computer 
equipment, and found approximately 184 images of child 
pornography.  Thus, on November 5, 2004 in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, Murray pleaded guilty to one count of possession of 
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  The 
District Court sentenced Murray to 40 months‟ imprisonment, with 
28 months to run concurrently to his New Jersey sentence and 12 
months to run consecutively.  In addition, it imposed a three-year 
term of supervised release, to run concurrently with the term of 
supervision imposed by the District of New Jersey.  The 
Pennsylvania District Court also imposed some special conditions of 
supervised release.
2
   
                                                          
1
  These included requirements that Murray: 1) register with 
the state sex offender registration agency in any state where he 
resides, is employed, etc.; 2) cooperate in the collection of his DNA; 
3) not obtain employment or perform volunteer work which includes 
contact with minor children; 4) not possess child pornography; 5) 
allow his probation officer the right of reasonable search of his 
residence or any other establishment within his control; 6) submit to 
unannounced searches of his computer equipment; and 7) advise the 
Probation Office of any computers to which he has access, and agree 
not to use others‟ computers unless the owners have consented to 
have them monitored.   
 
2
  These included requirements that Murray: 1) participate in a 
mental health treatment program, which may include urine testing, at 
the direction and discretion of the probation officer; 2) cooperate in 
the collection of his DNA; and 3) have restricted computer use, 
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B. 
 
On July 2, 2010, Murray was released from prison and began 
his term of supervised release.
3
  Murray relocated to a small city 
near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and in August and September 2010, 
jurisdiction over him for the remainder of his supervised release 
terms was transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania.  
Though Murray had not violated or otherwise failed to comply with 
any of his existing supervised release conditions, the Probation 
Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania sought to modify 
those conditions “to reflect the language approved by the Court in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania relative to individuals 
convicted of similar offenses.”  App. 58.  Some of the requested 
conditions were duplicative of those already mandated by the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the District of New Jersey, but 
others were new.  Among the Probation Office‟s proposed 
conditions were requirements that Murray:  
                                                                                                                                  
monitored contact with minors, and counseling as directed by the 
probation officer.   
 
3
  Murray was arrested and detained on July 25, 2003, and 
there is no indication that he was ever released on bail.  While our 
record is not clear on this point, it seems that it was a combination of 
credit for the time he served prior to his sentencing, along with good 
time credit, that permitted Murray‟s release on July 2, 2010, 
approximately 7 years later.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (“[A] 
prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year . 
. . may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner‟s sentence, 
beyond time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the 
prisoner‟s term of imprisonment . . . [if] the prisoner has displayed 
exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.”). 
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1) participate in a mental health and/or sex offender 
treatment program and submit to polygraph testing to 
determine if he is in compliance with the conditions of his 
release;  
2) register as a sex offender;  
3) not possess any material depicting or describing 
sexually explicit conduct;  
4) not possess any material depicting or describing 
child pornography;  
5) consent to the installation of computer monitoring 
hardware/software to monitor any computer or 
electronic device he may use, and pay for the cost of 
this monitoring;  
6) consent to the seizure and removal of any hardware 
or data storage media he might possess for further 
analysis by the Probation Officer upon reasonable 
suspicion that he committed an unlawful act or 
violated his conditions of supervised release;  
7) notify his employer of the nature of his conviction if 
he is going to use a computer at work;  
8) provide the Probation Officer with information, 
including passwords, about any and all computers and 
other electronic devices to which he has access; and  
9) submit his person, property, house, residence, 
vehicle, papers, and business or place of employment 
to a search upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or 
a violation of a condition of supervision.   
 
On March 29, 2011, the Probation Office submitted a 
Supplemental Petition requesting leave to incorporate additional 
language, which it had inadvertently omitted, into one of the 
proposed conditions.  Specifically, the Probation Office expanded 
upon Proposed Condition Five to add a requirement that Murray 
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submit any of his computers, cell phones, or other electronic devices 
to periodic, unannounced examinations by his Probation Officer.     
 
Murray filed a brief in opposition to these modifications.  He 
argued, among other things, that his conditions of supervised release 
should not be changed because he had not violated his existing 
release conditions, and he emphasized that the Probation Office had 
not explained why the existing conditions were insufficient to serve 
the purposes of sentencing.  The Probation Office then filed Second 
Supplemental Petitions in both cases, in which it stated that it had 
“inadvertently included [in the previous petitions] conditions of 
supervision that would not be appropriate in this case.”  App. 104.  
The Probation Office thus retracted proposed Conditions One 
(mental health treatment and polygraph testing), Two (sex offender 
registration), Three (possession of sexually explicit material), and 
Four (possession of material depicting child pornography) without 
describing why they were inappropriate. 
 
A hearing was held before the District Court on May 25, 
2011.  The District Court ultimately issued an Opinion and Order 
that granted the Petition on Supervised Release and the 
Supplemental Petition and directed that Murray‟s conditions of 
supervised release be modified to impose all nine proposed 
conditions.  The Court did not explain why it was mandating the 
imposition of those conditions that the Probation Office had since 
retracted, and it found that it could modify Murray‟s conditions of 
supervised release regardless of whether “new or unforeseen” 
circumstances had arisen.  The Court also held, in the alternative, 
that if changed circumstances were required, the transfer of 
jurisdiction over Murray‟s case to the Western District of 
Pennsylvania was sufficient.  The District Court noted that it had 
considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and concluded that the 
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requested conditions involved no greater deprivation of liberty than 
was reasonably necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.   
 
Murray filed a Motion for Reconsideration, in which he 
emphasized that the Probation Office had since retracted the first 
four proposed conditions.  The District Court denied this motion, but 
also stated that it was amending its prior Order “to include the 
granting of the Second Supplemental Petitions on Supervised 
Release.”  App. 12.  Unfortunately, the import of this statement is 
unclear.  Arguably, by granting the Second Supplemental Petitions, 
the Court could be said to have vacated the first four proposed 
conditions.  As a practical matter, however, Murray‟s counsel 
represented to this Court at oral argument that Murray has been 
subject to at least Condition One, relating to polygraph testing.  
Thus, we will assume for the purposes of this opinion that the 
District Court never retracted the first four conditions.  
 
Murray timely appealed from both District Court Orders.  
  
II. 
 
Murray‟s case was transferred to the Western District of 
Pennsylvania for oversight of his supervised release.  Thus, the 
District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3605 (transfer 
of jurisdiction over a releasee) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) 
(modification of supervised release conditions).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
III. 
 
Generally, we “review challenges to the imposition of a 
special condition of supervised release, as well as a district court‟s 
decision to modify the terms of release, for abuse of discretion.”  
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United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 713, 716 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 183 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
A. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) provides that a court may, after 
considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 
modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at 
any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of 
supervised release, pursuant to the provision of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure relating to the modification of probation and the 
provisions applicable to the initial setting of the terms and conditions 
of post-release supervision. 
 
The relevant Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
32.1(c), further provides that an individual‟s supervised release 
conditions may not be modified unless the court holds a hearing and 
allows him to attend with counsel and make arguments in favor of 
mitigation.
4
  The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 32.1(b) add 
that, “[p]robation conditions should be subject to modification, for 
the sentencing court must be able to respond to changes in the 
probationer‟s circumstances as well as new ideas and methods of 
rehabilitation.”   
 
B. 
 
Murray argues that, because it is undisputed that he did not 
violate his original conditions of supervised release, the District 
Court was required to find that new or unforeseen circumstances had 
                                                          
4
  A hearing is not required if the individual waives it or if the 
relief sought is favorable to the individual and the government does 
not object.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(2).  
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arisen that justified the modification.  He says that the District 
Court‟s decision to the contrary “is inconsistent with,” among other 
things, “the fundamental principle of finality in the federal criminal 
justice system” and the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 32.1, 
which make reference to changes in the releasee‟s circumstances.   
Appellant‟s Br. 28.  The Government responds that “numerous cases 
have rejected the proposition that „changed circumstances‟ are a 
prerequisite to modifying a defendant‟s terms of supervised release.”  
Appellee‟s Br. 20.  In the alternative, the Government argues that 
“Murray‟s „transfer of jurisdiction‟ was a sufficient „changed 
circumstance‟ to warrant the modifications of [his] release terms.”  
Id. 
 
It is an open question in our Circuit whether a district court 
must find new or unforeseen circumstances before it may modify a 
person‟s conditions of supervised release.  See United States v. 
Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 43 n.12 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing 
United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 713 (3d Cir. 2006), as having left 
open the question of whether “significantly changed or extraordinary 
circumstances are [a] prerequisite to modification”).  Indeed, there 
appears to be a split among our sister circuits on this issue.  
Compare United States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that “Miller [had] allege[d] a type of changed 
circumstance that, if true, may justify judicial modification of a 
defendant‟s supervised release.”), and United States v. Lussier, 104 
F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Section 3583(e) provides the district 
court with retained authority to . . . modify terms and conditions of 
supervised release . . . in order to account for new or unforeseen 
circumstances.”), with United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1170-
71 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Although Begay asks us . . . to limit the district 
court‟s authority to modify special conditions of supervised release 
to only those cases where the government can show a change in 
circumstances, we refuse to impose that limitation on the district 
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court‟s authority.”), and United States v. Davies, 380 F.3d 329, 332 
(8th Cir. 2004) (“A district court may modify the conditions imposed 
on a term of supervised release even when . . . the modification is 
based only on evidence that was available at the original sentencing.  
This is because the statute that authorizes district courts to modify 
the conditions of supervised release does not require new evidence, 
nor even changed circumstances in the defendant‟s life.”).   
 
There is a risk, however, of overstating the degree to which 
our sister circuits are actually in conflict.  Neither the Ninth nor the 
Second Circuit has gone so far as to describe a showing of new or 
unforeseen circumstances as necessary or as a prerequisite to 
modification.  Thus, we might say that these courts have merely 
described conditions that are sufficient, but not necessary, to justify 
modification.   Notably, the Second and Ninth Circuits were writing 
in response to petitions by individual releasees who wished to see 
their conditions of supervised release reduced, while the Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits were responding to petitions by the Government.  It 
may be that courts are particularly wary of giving releasees another 
avenue to challenge their sentences, and have thus required them to 
make a threshold showing of new or unforeseen circumstances.  At 
the same time, nothing in the statutory scheme suggests that it 
should be easier for the Government to make release terms more 
stringent than it is for the individual to receive mitigation.  Thus, 
whatever rule is promulgated will apply equally to the Government 
and individual defendants. 
 
We note that the statute that permits modification of 
supervised release terms, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), makes no mention 
of any new or changed circumstances requirement—an omission 
which leads us to doubt that such a requirement exists.  
Nevertheless, we need not resolve this circuit split today.  Even 
assuming that a threshold showing of changed circumstances is 
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required, the Government has met its burden.  Specifically, as a 
matter of plain language interpretation, Murray‟s move to a new 
jurisdiction constituted a “new circumstance.”  This change 
permitted the District Court to consider the Government‟s petition 
for modification of Murray‟s release conditions.  Although Murray 
insists that his move was not a “changed circumstance[] specific to 
[him] which affect[s] general punishment aims such as deterrence or 
rehabilitation,” we disagree.  Appellant‟s Br. 42-43.  When a 
releasee moves to a new area, various sentencing factors might be 
implicated.  For example, the conditions of supervised release 
imposed by the sentencing court must reflect the need “to provide 
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).  If a district court sets as a 
condition of supervised release the requirement that an individual 
must attend a specialized mental health program for sex offenders, 
and that individual then moves to a rural area where no such 
program is offered, the court might reasonably respond by 
modifying the releasee‟s conditions to reflect the rehabilitation 
programs that are available.  Whether Murray‟s move necessitated 
similar adjustments to his release conditions was a question that the 
District Court properly considered.  
 
We therefore turn to the question of whether the particular 
modifications that were imposed in this case were appropriate. 
 
C. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) authorizes a sentencing court to impose a 
condition of supervised release “to the extent that such condition—
(1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)]; [and] (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section [3553(a)].”  
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18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) & (2).   The specific 3553(a) factors that 
must be considered are: “the nature of a defendant‟s offense and the 
defendant‟s history and characteristics; the need for adequate 
deterrence; the need to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and the need to provide the defendant with correctional 
treatment including vocational training or medical care.”  United 
States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 183 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Notably, in 
addition to the sentencing goals enumerated, § 3553(a) also requires 
parsimony—that „[t]he court impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary.‟”  United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 
197 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
“[W]e review the reasonableness of a supervised release term 
against the § 3553(a) factors, recognizing that the primary purpose 
of supervised release is to facilitate the integration of offenders back 
into the community rather than to punish them.”  Albertson, 645 
F.3d at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Congress intended 
supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to 
community life.”  United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000).  
Thus, “supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from 
those served by incarceration.”  Id.  Importantly, “[s]upervised 
release . . . is not punishment in lieu of incarceration,” United States 
v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 50 (1994), but rather is primarily 
concerned with “facilitat[ing] the reintegration of the defendant into 
the community.”  United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 
1995).  Indeed, it is notable that “the only [traditional sentencing] 
factor not relevant to a court‟s decision of whether to impose 
supervised release . . . is „the need for the sentence imposed to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the offense.‟”  U.S. Sentencing 
Comm‟n, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release 8-9 
(2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)).  This omission 
reinforces the idea that the primary purpose of supervised release is 
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to facilitate the reentry of offenders into their communities, rather 
than to inflict punishment.  See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 124 (1983), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307 (explaining that the goal 
of supervised release is “to ease the defendant‟s transition into the 
community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly 
serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has 
spent a fairly short period in prison . . . but still needs supervision 
and training programs after release”).  
 
“We have consistently required that district courts explain 
and justify conditions of supervised release.”  Miller, 594 F.3d at 
184.  “[I]t is . . . important that district courts provide courts of 
appeals with an explanation sufficient for us to see that the particular 
circumstances of the case have been given meaningful consideration 
within the parameters of § 3553(a).”  United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Nevertheless, we have held that “[a] sentencing court does 
not have to discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) 
factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into 
account in sentencing.”  Id. at 568 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, if we find that a district court has failed to make 
clear why it imposed a particular condition of supervised release, we 
may proceed in one of two ways.  Either we may remand to the 
district court for further explanation or we may affirm the condition 
“if we can ascertain any viable basis for the . . . restriction in the 
record . . . .”  Miller, 594 F.3d at 184 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
In the instant case, the District Court believed that “there 
[wa]s no meaningful difference between the proposed modifications 
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and the current conditions” of supervised release.5  App. 8-9.  Based 
on this misapprehension, it seemed to assume that little discussion of 
how the proposed supervised release conditions comported with the 
requirements of § 3553(a) was needed.  Although it made the 
conclusory statement that, “after considering the factors set forth in § 
3553(a) we find that the requested conditions involve no greater 
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes 
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(d)(2),” it did not enumerate the § 3553(a) factors or apply them 
to Murray‟s case.  App. 9.  In fact, the District Court‟s only 
reference to any specific sentencing factor was its comment that “the 
Probation Officer has not alleged that the existing conditions are 
insufficient to further the legitimate statutory goals of deterrence, 
protection of the public, and rehabilitation of the defendant.”  Id. at 
5.   
 
Indeed, the District Court justified the imposition of the new 
conditions largely on the ground that the changes would be 
“positive” for Murray.  Id. at 9.  This was the case, it said, because 
the “precision and comprehensiveness [of the new conditions] 
add[ed] clear guidance for Mr. Murray and for the Probation Officer 
tasked with enforcing the conditions.”  Id.  While clarity is no doubt 
a virtue, it is not one of the sentencing factors enumerated in § 
3553(a).  Because the District Court offered no other explanation for 
its conclusion that the new conditions “involve[d] no greater 
                                                          
5
  Murray himself actually made somewhat the same 
argument in his brief to the District Court.  See App. 134 (“[T]he 
Government has failed to identify any respect in which the 
conditions to which Mr. Murray is already subject differ in any 
meaningful way from the modification sought or how this has 
created any difficulty whatsoever with the supervision of Mr. 
Murray.”).  
16 
 
deprivation [of liberty] than is reasonably necessary for the purposes 
set forth in section [3553(a)],” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), our review of 
its opinion is made significantly more challenging. 
 
While we may still affirm the District Court if we are able to 
ascertain a viable basis for the new conditions in the record, we are 
unable to do so on the facts before us.  At the outset, we are unclear 
why the District Court elected to impose the four proposed 
supervised release conditions that the Probation Office had conceded 
were inappropriate in Murray‟s case.  (In fact, as described above, it 
is possible that the District Court actually intended to vacate those 
conditions, but its Order was unclear in this regard.)  Moreover, it 
seems that the prior conditions were successfully meeting the goals 
of § 3553(a) in that they were deterring Murray from committing 
additional crimes, providing him with needed mental health 
counseling, and protecting the public.  Thus, to the extent that the 
District Court effectively made Murray‟s supervised release 
conditions more restrictive, some explanation of why this was 
necessary would have been helpful.  For these reasons, we will 
vacate the Orders imposing the nine new conditions of supervised 
release, and remand this case to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
D. 
 
We thus ask the District Court to more clearly explain why 
these new release conditions are no greater than necessary to satisfy 
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  For example, if the District Court 
meant to leave Condition Three (possession of sexually explicit 
material) in place, despite the Probation Office‟s effort to have it 
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removed,
6
 the Court should be aware that “there are First 
Amendment implications for a ban that extends to explicit material 
involving adults.”  United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 151 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Hence our case law has “recognize[d] that a term of 
supervised release restricting access to adult sexually oriented 
materials must be „narrowly tailored,‟ i.e., that the restriction must 
result in a benefit to public safety.”  United States v. Thielemann, 
575 F.3d 265, 273 n.15 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Loy, 
237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Voelker, 
489 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Although „the District Court 
could, perfectly consonant with the Constitution, restrict [an 
offender‟s] access to sexually oriented materials,‟ such a restriction 
must have a nexus to the goals of supervised release.  We are unable 
to find any such nexus here, and the District Court‟s failure to 
explain its reasons makes our review all the more difficult.” (quoting 
Loy, 237 F.3d at 267)).  Thus, we must ask the District Court to 
provide an explanation for the imposition of Condition Three 
sufficient to show that it is narrowly tailored and related to the goals 
of supervised release.  
 
As another example, Condition Nine (workplace searches), 
has elicited strenuous objection from Murray and warrants 
discussion by the District Court on remand.  Condition Nine requires 
                                                          
6
  We have had some difficultly discerning the Government‟s 
position with respect to certain release conditions that are at issue in 
this case.  While in its Second Supplemental Petition before the 
District Court, the Probation Office clearly stated that it wished to 
retract Conditions One through Four because they “would not be 
appropriate in this case,” App. 104, at oral argument before this 
Court the Government stated that it would defend Conditions One, 
Two, and Four.  Puzzling out the Government‟s arguments is a task 
we will leave for the District Court on remand.     
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Murray to “submit his . . . place of employment[] to a search, 
conducted by a United States probation/pretrial services officer at a 
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, based upon reasonable 
suspicion of contraband or evidence of a violation of a condition of 
supervision.”  App. 59.  It further states that Murray shall “inform 
any other residents that the premises may be subject to searches 
pursuant to this condition.”  Id.  Murray notes that Condition Nine 
does not define “place of employment,” nor is the prospective search 
limited to his personal workspace.  He argues that this condition 
“will render [him] virtually unemployable as it is inconceivable that 
any employer would hire an employee knowing [that this] gives the 
government carte blanche to search the employer‟s place of 
business—be it a personal residence or a private office—without 
limitation.”  Appellant‟s Br. 53 n.5.  We do not need to rule on these 
arguments at this juncture, but the District Court should address 
them, providing sufficient explanation of its decision to enable us to 
understand its rationale.  If Condition Nine is to remain in place, the 
arguments Murray has made—which are not frivolous, even if they 
may not persuade the District Court— ought to be addressed in a 
manner that will permit appellate review.   
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons described herein, we will remand the case to 
the District Court.  On remand, the Court should carefully consider 
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and impose only those of the 
Government‟s requested supervised release conditions that involve 
no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to 
achieve the purposes set forth in section 3553(a).  The Court should 
provide explanations for its conclusions, as appropriate. 
 
